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tantly, educational provision as well as multicultural thinking often contribute to language policy 
prescription in those nations whose citizens are skilled in more than one language. Given that na-
tional capacity building in second language provision has domestic as well as external considera-
tions, this investigation of the Report’s policy implementation in the National Asian Languages 
and Studies in Australian Schools (NALSAS) Strategy also provides insights into the challenges of 
establishing other languages in the school curriculum for language educators throughout the world.   
In December 1992, heads of government from the states, territories and the Commonwealth at 
the annual Council of Australian Governments (COAG) meeting debated the need to increase the 
proficiency of Asian languages and cultures skills in Australia. At this time there was increasing 
awareness that although Australia’s national language, English, was growing as an international 
language, it was not adequate to meet the needs of learners in a multi-lingual world and the Asian 
region in particular. At the conclusion of this meeting, COAG members established a high level 
working group to prepare a report on the then-current level of Commonwealth and State commit-
ment toward Asian language and culture education in Australia.  This group was also asked to 
propose a framework designed to implement a national Asian languages and cultures program in 
Australian primary and secondary schools by the end of the 1990s.  
This was a momentous task, for whilst “Australia is rich in its linguistic potential, offering a 
wealth of languages” (Clyne, 1993, p. 53), competing legitimate demands for the provision of lan-
guage study within the nation, meant  that the teaching and learning of languages in Australia was 
contested. As Carr and Pauwels (2006, p. 5) observed, even the nomenclature for languages used 
in the community and learned in schools was disputed. This paper contends that three categories of 
languages had a claim on government and community support in Australia by the early 1990s. 
These were strategically important languages, such as Chinese (Mandarin) and Indonesian; tradi-
tionally taught European languages such as French and German; and community languages, such 
as Italian and Greek.  Moreover, as will be seen, any attempt to formulate national education pol-
icy in the Australian federal system had to be negotiated through multi-layered individual state and 
territory education bureaucracies as well as different bureaucracies at the Commonwealth level. 
This process was highly complex, time consuming and frequently contested. 
In February 1994, the COAG working group presented its report, Asian Languages and Austra-
lia’s Economic Future (Rudd, 1994). This Report is referred to as the Rudd Report in this paper, 
after the Chair of the Working Group that produced it, Kevin Rudd. Rudd was the most influential 
public servant in the Queensland government at this time, and a key advocate of engagement with 
Asia and the teaching of Asian languages. Rudd is currently Leader of Federal Labor’s Opposition. 
In framing its strategic focus, Asian Languages and Australia’s Economic Future (1994) observed 
that numerous reports before it emphasised the need for Australians to have Asian languages and 
cultures skills.  Accordingly, this part of the paper provides a brief overview of both the advocacy 
for Asian languages and cultures in Australia and the inertia that prevented a national strategy 
from being implemented prior to the Rudd Report’s acceptance in 1994.   
In 1969, the Auchmuty Report argued for Asian studies to be accorded “parity of esteem” with 
the study of European languages and cultures in the Australian education system (Auchmuty, 
1969) and concluded that “Asian languages are not sufficiently widely available at secondary 
level” (p. 90). Auchmuty’s (1969) prescient justification that “practical arguments” (p. 20) such as 
“the steady growth in economic, cultural, political and military links between Asia and Australia 
during the last two decades” (p. 20) indicated that the “reappraisal of Australia’s traditional atti-
tudes towards Asia” (p. 11) would have to commence in the classroom continued to resonate in the 
calls that followed. Indeed, between 1969 -1994, some  40 government and non-government poli-
cies, documents, committees, working parties and organisations “explored aspects of the need for 
Australians to learn Asian languages and cultures” (Henderson, 1999, p. 61). The prevailing con-
cern evident in those documents and policies which focused on the need to teach Asian languages 
and studies in Australia was that knowledge about Asia was essential for the national interest. At 
specific times, such documents have intersected with other government policies on languages, and 
with policies and reports on education reform, business, trade and economic matters. However, 
“what is striking about the policy arguments for Asian studies is that they have independently pur-
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sued the placement of Asian studies on the education agenda in terms of Australia’s national inter-
est” (Henderson, 1999, p. 64).  
This paper contends that the national interest1 rationale shifted in emphasis as national Labor 
governments began to view second languages as a national resource, and to acknowledge Asia as 
the regional key to solving Australia’s immediate and long term economic problems (Henderson, 
2003). As successive national governments in the period from 1983 drew education into the proc-
ess of micro-economic reform, the language of policy prescription and the language of policy de-
bate about the study of Asian languages and cultures reflected an increasing preoccupation with 
economism. Moreover, these debates intensified as those groups opposed to Asian languages and 
studies condemned the growing emphasis on Asian languages. Such opposition can be categorised 
in four ways. First was the assumption that as English was the international language of business it 
was not necessary to teach Asian languages. Second was the argument that Asian languages might 
undermine the “Europeaness” of Australia’s cultural heritage and therefore European languages 
were the appropriate “foreign” languages to be taught. The third view extended this position and 
its advocates argued that the study of character-based languages such as Chinese (Mandarin) and 
Japanese took too long to master and therefore should not be taught in schools. Fourth, advocates 
of community-based languages claimed that government resources should meet the needs of mi-
grant groups in Australia. Concomitantly, other groups argued for control over the policy process 
so that their beliefs, and their preferences for the sort of Asia literacy required in the national inter-
est, would be manifested in policy prescription. The intensification of this debate also reflected 
wider concerns about the government’s mandate to make language policy and education policy in 
the national interest.  
Indeed, this consistent struggle over what sort of knowledge was most valuable and who 
should make the policy decisions about it, intensified to such a degree that a national strategy for 
Asia literacy became hamstrung. Moreover, as noted earlier, the Constitutional division of powers 
in Australia2 meant that policy implementation in education was essentially a shared and highly 
complex business between the Commonwealth and the States and Territories3. It can be argued 
that the national government, cognisant of the potential political fall-out from some of the power-
ful language lobby groups, was reluctant to exercise its mandate in this matter and passed the issue 
back to the States. Hence, from 1991 responsibility for prioritising which Languages Other Than 
English (LOTEs) would be studied in schools was effectively left to the States and they deter-
mined the outcome with reference to the politics of that matter within their own constituencies. 
Similarly, the implementation of Asian studies across the curriculum remained the prerogative of 
the States.  
The 1992 COAG brief provided the opportunity to establish a long term strategy for Asia-
literacy by framing it as a cooperative policy between the Commonwealth and the States.  The use 
of COAG as the forum to generate political leadership on a national policy direction for Asian 
languages and cultures instead of the existing structure for national education policy making, the 
intergovernmental council made up of all State, Territory and federal Ministers for Education - the 
Australian Education Council (AEC)4 was most significant. Given the succession of past policy 
failures, advocates for a national strategy such as Rudd, and Queensland’s Premier at the time, 
Wayne Goss, were cognisant that an Asian languages and cultures strategy would only take effect 
if it received political endorsement at the COAG level of power by federal and State leaders5. 
The assumption underpinning this model was that the interests of both levels of government 
would be met and result in an outcome that was in Australia’s national interest. COAG’s mandate 
gave the Intergovernmental Working Group, chaired by Rudd, unprecedented authority in drafting 
policy prescription, and the brief made explicit that the overarching focus for a national strategy 
was to facilitate “Australia’s economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region” (Rudd, 1994, p. i). 
Moreover, this paper contends that Rudd was not only cognisant that previous debates had under-
mined the political will to implement policy prescription, but he was also aware that it was the 
economic rationale which carried the most authority in convincing politicians of the need for a 
national strategy for Asia literacy.  
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In recommending an increasing focus on languages acquisition, the Report stressed that the 
number of Year 12 students studying a second language had fallen dramatically in Australia. 
 
In the late 1960s, almost 40% of year 12s studied a second language. By 1982, this figure had fallen to 
16.1%. In 1992 only 12.5% of Year 12 students were studying a second language … (s)ignificantly, less 
than 4% of Year 12 students today are studying an Asian language. (Rudd, 1994, p. iii) 
 
Such figures were “noted with concern” (Rudd, 2005, p. 2) at the COAG meeting.  The Work-
ing Group’s recommendations that State and Territory Governments endorse the 1991 Common-
wealth White Paper (Department of Employment, Education and Training (DEET), 1991a, 1991b) 
targets of having 25 per cent of Year 12 students studying a second language were “welcomed” 
(Rudd, 2005, p. 2). Further, the COAG Communiqué noted that Governments would aim to 
achieve that target through a 10 year strategy, commencing in the 1996 school year, comprising of 
programs outlined in the Report.  
After “considerable debate” (Rudd, personal communication, December 4, 1998), COAG ac-
cepted the Report and endorsed its recommendations with one with one exception6, on 25 February 
1994 at its Hobart7 meeting. COAG “noted the importance of the development of a comprehensive 
understanding of Asian languages and cultures through the Australian education system if Austra-
lia is to maximise its economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region” (Rudd, 1994, p. i).  As Rudd 
observed, “(p)ut simply, it was a fusion of political and bureaucratic willpower which came to-
gether to transform it from a strategy, into a reality” (Rudd, 2005, p. 4). Indeed, following 
COAG’s acceptance, Rudd put on the public record his acknowledgement of the magnitude of 
such bipartisan agreement across the levels of state and federal government. According to Rudd, 
the decision to fund the Report at a time of budgetary constraints was 
  
unusual, considering the spinoffs will not be apparent for many years. "If the country is going to bite the 
bullet on what is a very long-term strategy, then it needs to start now. It is a refreshing and visionary deci-
sion by Labor and Liberal governments to focus not just on the short term." (Rudd, cited in Roberts, 1994, 
p. 20) 
 
2  The Report’s policy prescription 
 
Asian Languages and Australia’s Economic Future (1994) emphasised that a national Asian 
languages and cultures strategy should be developed in the context of second language provision. 
To this end, it recommended that four priority Asian languages, selected for their economic sig-
nificance to Australia, and studied through a school-based program, form the thrust of an Asian 
languages/cultures initiative in the Australian education system. The languages chosen were Japa-
nese, Chinese (Mandarin), Indonesian and Korean. The Report recommended that these language 
priorities be periodically reviewed against future regional developments (Rudd, 1994, p. 44). As 
noted, the Report endorsed the Commonwealth’s 1991 White Paper targets, however, it recom-
mended that the target date be extended from 2000 to 2006. Significantly, the Report recom-
mended that 15% of Year 12 students should study a priority Asian language while the remaining 
10% study other languages by this date. Further, it was recommended that 60% of Year 10 stu-
dents should study a priority Asian language by 2006.  
The Report also addressed the issue of language proficiency and recommended that Education 
Ministers develop proficiency scales, testing and reporting mechanisms for the four priority Asian 
languages and that specific targets be established for a school based national program.  Further, the 
Report recommended that Asian cultures courses be developed within the Key Learning Area of 
Studies of Society and Environment, and that proficiency outcomes which reflect appropriate 
learning in this area be determined by the beginning of the 1996 school year. As McKay (2005) 
observed, the construction and implementation of standards, also called outcomes-based curricula, 
by governments was driven by neo-liberal ideology, “not simply by principles of educational phi-
losophy” (p. 244). As noted, during the years immediately prior to the commissioning and accep-
Deborah Henderson 8 
 
tance of the Rudd Report, the assumption that national education was indispensable to economic 
recovery, was driving many education reforms in Australia. Ironically, the years of lobbying by 
Australian Asianists for a national strategy for Asian studies which culminated in the National 
Strategy (Asian Studies Council, 1988) and the Ingleson Report (Asian Studies Council, 1989), 
coincided with the peak period of policy reforms by the Minister for Employment, Education and 
Training in the Hawke Government, John Dawkins (1989–1991), notably to the higher education 
sector. The prioritising of Asian studies in certain government policy documents, such as the 
Higher Education White Paper (Dawkins, 1988), was debated by policy group elites. The concern 
was that the link between the utilitarian outcomes of Asian studies with government policy moves 
to integrate the Australian economy in the Asian region, appeared to downgrade the intellectual, 
philosophical and cultural rationales for studying Asian languages and cultures (Healy, 1990). 
When Paul Keating became Prime Minister in 1991, the emphasis on making explicit links be-
tween education, training and work coalesced with the micro-economic push for the standardisa-
tion of observable outcomes evident in the major education reports to come out of this period, such 
as the Finn Report (Australian Education Council, 1991), the Mayer Report (Mayer, 1992) and the 
Carmichael Report (Employment and Skills Formation Council, 1992). Indeed, the Rudd Report 
argued that “it was pointless developing an expanded school-based program in Asian lan-
guages/cultures unless we have some means of measuring its long term effectiveness ... quantita-
tive targets ... provide one basis of measuring program outcomes. But these must be integrated 
with appropriate qualitative measures capable of assessing proficiency outcomes” (Rudd, 1994, p. 
x). In this sense the Report reflected both the political nature of its origins and the impact of 
changing regional circumstances on Australia’s export competitiveness, for it was “prepared in the 
context of a concerted national policy effort over recent years involving all levels of government 
aimed at the internationalisation of the Australian economy” (Rudd, 1994, p. ii).  
Notable in the Report’s recommendations was that second language learning be mandated dur-
ing the compulsory years of schooling and that Year 3 be considered as the most appropriate start-
ing age for studying a second language. The Report also tackled the number of hours required for 
second language proficiency, and stipulated that 2.5 hours of instruction per week for each year of 
study was required for Years 3 to 10, and that 3 hours per week was necessary for Years 11 and 12. 
The Report recommended that a minimum national standard for Asian language teachers be 
developed to ascertain levels of proficiency; that a strategy to ensure the required number of ap-
propriately proficient Asian language teachers be established; that curriculum statements and 
frameworks for the priority languages be established and that teaching materials be developed for 
Asian languages and cultures education. The impact of projected higher Asian languages/cultures 
proficiency outcomes on TAFE and university courses was considered and the Report recom-
mended that a high level working group from the relevant authorities investigate the implications 
for course offerings.  
Three broad programs were recommended as the implementation machinery for the Report’s 
policy priorities. The first was a school-based program to cover Year 3-10 and Years 11-12 lan-
guages and cultures programs. First titled the Asian Languages and Studies in Australian Schools 
(ALSAS) program, it would become known as the National Asian Languages and Studies (NAL-
SAS) strategy during the first term of its implementation. The second program was concerned with 
a smaller number of schools and focused on an Asian Language Immersion (ALI) program. The 
third program dealt with an optional Year 13 course, offered on a scholarship basis, to facilitate “in 
country” language study before tertiary study.  
Of course, such broad-ranging and long-term national programs for Asian languages and cul-
tures education required extensive funding, and the Report was explicit in how this was to be 
achieved. It presented details of costing for the period from 1995 to 2006 and recommended that 
each year a 50% contribution from the Commonwealth be matched by a 50% contribution from the 
States. As Lingard (1994, p. 6) observed, the Report “seems to be of a piece with the drive towards 
a more unified, collaborative national curriculum strongly pursued by John Dawkins as Federal 
Minister for Employment, Education and Training)8. The Report’s core theme was developed 
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through its economic rationale for an Asian languages/cultures strategy and its emphasis on the 
human capital view of students. The Report was explicit about its purpose. It focused on “Asian 
languages and complementary Asian cultures education in Australian schools as a means of en-
hancing Australian economic interests in East Asia” (Rudd, 1994, p. ii). It must be noted that the 
Report did not envisage language proficiency as an end in itself, rather the Report’s long-term goal 
was to link Asian language proficiency with other professional skills. These emphases supported 
the policy push for an export culture.  
Moreover, the Report was at pains to link its policy prescription with the Commonwealth gov-
ernment’s micro-economic reform agenda. According to the Report, the school-based strategy was 
the only means “to achieve the sort of high-level language outcomes sought for the priority lan-
guages identified in the report - particularly given the length, continuity and intensity of instruction 
needed to achieve those outcomes” (Rudd, 1994, p. 96). As Wilson (1995) put it “(w)hat has made 
this Report different is that it has overtly, one might say unashamedly, linked language learning in 
schools to national economic performance and put considerable resources, some A$1442.2 million 
for the period 1995-2006, to realising its goals” (p. 98).  
The Report’s observation that “(o)nly through the school system will long-term, sustainable 
generational change in attitudes to the East Asian region be realised” (Rudd, 1994, p. 98) reiterated 
the emphases of  the Asian Studies Council’s National Strategy (1988) and the Ingleson Report 
(1989). However, the Report’s broad goal of creating a “critical mass” (Rudd, 1994, p. 98)9 was 
closer to the National Strategy (1988) than it was to the Ingleson Report (1989), for the former 
advocated a three-tiered approach10 for Australia’s current and future economic interests, while 
Ingleson (1989) was concerned that the complementarity of Asian studies and Australian studies11 
be central in policy prescription. Moreover, the Rudd Report did not work within the paradigm 
that informed the National Strategy (1988) and Ingleson’s work (1989). These earlier emphases 
balanced the economic rationale with intellectual, philosophical and cultural rationales for learning 
Asian languages. Rather, the human capital paradigm was paramount, and the Report followed the 
dual model approach first advocated by the National Strategy (1988), and then endorsed by the 
Garnaut Report (Garnaut, 1989) and the Leal Report (Leal, Bettoni & Malcolm, 1991), for Austra-
lia needed “to integrate Asian languages/cultures skills with other professional and occupational 
skills of the workforce” (Rudd, 1994, p. 77).  
Although the Report’s policy prescription prioritised Asian languages by stipulating that 15% 
of Year 12 students should study one of the four target languages by 2006, its endorsement and 
extension of the Commonwealth’s White Paper targets provided for an increase in other languages. 
Indeed, the Report’s Asian languages goals did not detract from the enrolment figures for Euro-
pean languages. Recommendation 5B suggested that governments “agree that the remaining 10% 
of the Year 12 target be met by studying other languages (up from the present figure of 8%)” 
(Rudd, 1994, p. x). This paper argues that this was a strategic move designed to steer the accent on 
priority Asian languages in the Report past attempts to politicise and undermine it12. One reviewer 
candidly observed “(e)ducation authorities regard the European languages traditionally taught here 
as being of little practical benefit - either to the economy or to students - but they will remain 
available” (Roberts, 1994, p. 21). The Report’s advocacy of second language learning expansion in 
Australia meant that  
 
these policy goals will not detract from the numbers of students currently studying the more traditional 
European languages. Neither ought they reduce the availability of what are usually referred to as commu-
nity languages, which are supported by various ethnic groups in Australia and which have usually been 
tied to the broader goals of multiculturalism. (Lingard, 1994, p.6)  
 
While the Report acknowledged that the study of Asian societies was significant, it did not af-
ford cultures equal emphasis in the Report. Rather, the Report’s central assumption that its policy 
prescription should be set in the context of overall second language provision drove the allocation 
of resources. In plain terms, this meant that Asian studies would be the “poor relation” in the im-
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plementation process. According to Wilson (1995), the long term impact of the Report’s strategy 
would result in  
 
the rather paltry amount, of some A$32.0 million, for Asian studies apart from languages, especially 
when viewed against the total of $1442.2 million, over the period 1995-2000. There is no provision there-
after for Asian studies while language provision continues to receive funding of well over A$100.0 mil-
lion per annum until 2006. (p. 112)  
 
The Rudd Report dealt explicitly with two components of teacher training for the priority lan-
guages, that is the number of teachers and the quality of such teachers. Indeed, Rudd put on the 
public record his acknowledgement of the lack of trained second language teachers and the impli-
cations of this for the Report’s strategy.  
 
Rudd says, funding aside, the present supply of qualified teachers is inadequate to begin the language 
program immediately. "That’s why it needs to be taken gradually over the next decade." (Rudd, cited in 
Roberts, 1994, p. 21)   
 
To sum up, the Rudd Report fulfilled its brief to establish a strategic framework for “the im-
plementation of a comprehensive Asian languages and cultures program in Australian schools” 
(Rudd, 1994, p. 1) in four ways. First, it was informed by the original terms of reference and this 
was reflected in the structure and content of the Report. Second, the Report was driven by the two 
assumptions which informed the brief13. Third, the Report’s rationale for the selection of the four 
priority Asian languages, and its long term strategy, derived from the statistical evidence of the 
East Asia Analytical Unit. This meant that those economies and markets in Asia deemed at the 
time to be most significant for Australia’s potential trade interests over the next twenty years were 
prioritised. Fourth, the Report’s long term strategy was cognisant of the current efforts by all Aus-
tralian jurisdictions in Asian languages and cultures education. Of course, the issue of whether the 
acquisition of Asian language skills directly contributes to increased export earnings was, and re-
mains, contested. 
However, although this was “a clever report” which operated “within the terms of reference 
given it by COAG” (Lingard, 1994, p. 6), a core issue lay unresolved throughout the Report’s 
drafting and, as will be seen, this was most significant for its implementation. This issue was re-
lated to the fact that some Commonwealth bureaucrats in the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet (PMC) were reluctant to commit funds for the Report’s implementation. The funding issue 
continued to be problematic and was not resolved until July, 1995. 
 
3  The Report’s reception 
 
The responses to Asian Languages and Australia’s Economic Future (Rudd, 1994) can be 
categorised in three ways. First, were those reviews which acknowledged and applauded the Re-
port’s pragmatism and policy achievement. COAG’s acceptance that the Report’s implementation 
costs should be shared, was noted in terms of  
 
something of a broader agreement across the spectrum of Australian Party politics of the desirable nature 
of Australia’s economic future and the role that education and training are to play in relation to it. (Lin-
gard, 1994, p. 6)  
 
Similarly, Singh (1996) remarked  
 
no doubt others are as puzzled as they are envious to see the Liberal and Labor constituents of the Council 
of Australian Governments apparently agree to support the funding of the $200 million for the initial im-
plementation of this proposal. (p. 157)  
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Wilson (1995) observed “(f)or once, the Commonwealth and the States and Territories are 
agreed ...” (p. 98), while even the Rudd Report’s most trenchant critic, the Australian Language 
and Literacy Council (ALLC), noted that  
 
no other single report, since the release of The Australian Language and Literacy Policy and the National 
Statement and Profile on Languages Other Than English, has had the impact upon Commonwealth, State 
and Territory policy in language education that Asian Languages and Australia’s Economic Future has 
enjoyed. (ALLC, 1996, p. 52)  
 
The second and third set of reviews revolved around the debate about who should control edu-
cation policy. Some reviews in the second strand critiqued the Report as an example of high level, 
centralised government policy making that was removed from education departments and their 
forums for deciding policy. Accordingly, the Report was placed in the continuum of federal La-
bor’s micro-economic education reform agenda and critiqued for its instrumentalism. 
The most strident attack against the Report was first made by Rodney Cavalier, the Chair of the 
Australian Language and Literacy Council, in his address to a Language Expo, sponsored by the 
National Languages and Literacy Institute (NLLIA), held in Sydney during July 1994. Cavalier’s 
address itemised fourteen points of criticism against the Report. These views were then published 
in the NLLIA’s July edition of Australian Language Matters. Although Cavalier’s (1994) public 
criticisms were flawed, Wilson’s (1995) caveat was most significant. He observed that Cavalier’s 
arguments were dangerous because they contained “sufficient truth to be superficially convincing” 
(p. 99) and that his conclusions appeared valid “only because of the omission or exclusion of other, 
related factors” (p. 99).  
Cavalier’s (1994) fourteen points of criticism can be summarised as focussing on the Rudd Re-
port’s national economic interest rationale, its advocacy of compulsory second language learning, 
its lack of attention to the concept of what constituted appropriate second language teacher training 
and the advocacy of certain languages above others. Cavalier’s assumption that there was no need 
for Asian language policy prescription was hardly surprising, for he argued in his own report14 that 
English was the language of international business and that government language education policy 
must “support diversity” (ALLC, 1994, p. 30) instead of determining priority languages on the 
premise that “prevailing verities will be a constant” (p. 30). As well, Cavalier (1994) alleged that 
the Report was silent on pedagogy, that its targets were unrealistic for inadequately trained teach-
ers, and that ill-conceived methods and conscripted students could not attain the quality of second 
language learning the Rudd Report wanted to achieve.  
Cavalier’s subsequent attacks in 1996 revealed his depth of resentment of high level policy 
making that went beyond the usual education forums. What was disturbing about these attacks was 
that they were made under the auspices of the Australian Language and Literacy Council’s 
(ALLC) report into the supply and quality of teachers of languages other than English - Language 
Teachers: The Pivot of Policy (ALLC, 1996). The thrust of the ALLC’s (1996) report was that 
“those responsible have not worked the policies through into practice” (p. 3). As Rizvi (1997) ob-
served, it was  
 
highly unusual for government reports to criticise strongly policies which have yet to be fully imple-
mented ... The ALLC report accuses governments of setting meaningless targets, of not doing enough to 
train more qualified teachers, and of developing plans devoid of an understanding of the conditions under 
which teachers work. (p. 111)  
 
According to the ALLC’s standpoint, the Rudd Report’s strategy represented  
 
a classic case of ambitious and massively expensive policy goals, unsupported by adequate numbers of 
fluent language teachers able to demonstrate the competencies required of a language teacher. (ALLC, 
1996, p. 180)15  
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However, it must be noted that Cavalier had another agenda in this criticism, for as noted 
above, his previous report, Speaking of Business (1994), had coincided with the release of the 
Rudd Report in February 1994, and was based on the assumption that English was the language of 
international business. The Rudd Report had been at pains to debunk this conjecture, most notably 
at the level of small business. The ALLC’s report claimed with reference to the number of LOTE 
teachers required  
 
(t)he Council of Australian Governments” report is not convincing in its claim that "only 40 per cent will 
be additional permanent language teacher numbers". This is in stark contrast to the conservative estimate 
of the Australian Language and Literacy Council that the figure would be much closer to a 500 per cent 
increase. (ALLC, 1996, p. 55)  
 
Knight and Lingard (1997) argued that the Rudd Report’s political derivation augured poorly 
for implementation and cited the critiques levelled against the Report in Language Teachers: the 
Pivot of Policy  (ALLC, 1996) as  
 
indicative to some extent of the catastrophic consequences in implementation terms of policy developed 
politically at such a distance from professional knowledge. (Knight & Lingard, 1997, p. 41)  
 
Similarly, the Report’s acceptance through the COAG process “rather than the relevant minis-
terial council” (Knight & Lingard, 1997, p. 40) was characterised as an example of the general 
trend in government decision making “remote from the usual education policy communities” (p. 
40). The Report was criticised by teacher educators for having unrealistic goals divorced from the 
realities of practice. Wilson’s (1995) observation that the Report was “silent on ‘pedagogy’ ” (p. 
108) reflected two wider interrelated problems which the Rudd Report did not address. First, how 
could a new educational culture which valued the teaching of second languages be established for 
LOTE teachers in an already overcrowded curriculum? Second, how could the contested issue of 
methodology be addressed, given that existing practice for LOTE teaching in Australia was in-
formed by the theory of communicative competence and this was contested by some (Wilson, 
1995; McMeniman, 1995; Henderson, 2002)? The implication was that unless both issues were 
addressed, the Report’s recommendations would not work. Kirkpatrick (1995a) went further and 
argued that the Report did not allocate enough time to the teaching of script-based languages, such 
as Modern Standard Chinese, Japanese and Korean. Moreover, he argued that these Asian lan-
guages  
 
should not be taught in primary schools or even at lower secondary school level to non-background 
speakers of these languages ... because of the relative difficulty in learning the languages. (Kirkpatrick, 
1995a, p. 6)16  
 
The third strand of reviews were informed by those educators who adopted a socio-culturalist 
critique and by those who utilised a post-colonial extension of this critique to claim that the Report 
perpetuated a “neo-Orientalist perception” (Lingard, 1994, p. 6). Those critics of government pol-
icy making who adopted a socio-cultural critique claimed that the Report underestimated “the deep 
ambivalence that exists in the Australian society about its engagement in Asia” (Rizvi, 1997, p. 
120) and that many Australians were confused about what this meant. This argument stressed that 
because Australians were expected to make a shift in their thinking about Asia, they were “unclear 
about the extent to which this involves a rejection of the dominant European languages, values and 
traditions” (Rizvi, 1997, p. 19)17.  
The reviews of the Report which relied upon the post-colonial critique pursued the notion of 
the autonomy of discourse analysis as an end in itself18. For example, Singh (1996) argued that the 
Report’s concept of Asia-literacy represented “a discursive formation to which Australian students 
can attach themselves at one of three different levels” (p. 161). This was, in fact, a reference to the 
Report’s strategy for creating a critical mass of Asia literate Australians with varying degrees of 
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expertise, first endorsed by the National Strategy (1988). This notion of Asia literacy was not a 
“discursive formation”, rather, it involved a realist appraisal of what the National Strategy defined 
as the “qualitative and quantitative change in the skills of Australians” (Asian Studies Council, 
1988, p. 11). Several educators (Rizvi, 1997, Williamson-Fien, 1996, Singh, 1996) regarded this 
notion of Asia literacy as “part of a new kind of neo-colonialist project” (Singh, 1996, p. 160). 
According to this view, the Report’s context for second language provision was inherently divisive 
for  
 
Asian languages occupy a contradictory space, being simultaneously the languages for connecting Austra-
lia with currents throughout Asia, and a line demarcating and reproducing existing privilege. (Singh, 1996, 
p. 162)  
 
However, no evidence was employed to clarify or substantiate this claim, which drew upon 
Said’s (1978/1991) conception of Orientalism19, and seemed to infer that Australian engagement 
involved processes of “connection” that advantaged Australia and disadvantaged Asia. 
There was, however, some significance in the critiques of the Report’s political genesis and its 
instrumental policy prescription. That is, because the members of the Working Group wanted to 
produce a policy prescription that was acceptable to politicians at the COAG forum, they drafted 
the Report within the assumption that linguistic competence would contribute to economic per-
formance. Rudd was resolute that this economic argument mattered and that a broader rationale 
would not have secured political support (Rudd, personal communication, December 4, 1998).  
 
4  Implementation in the first quadrennium 
 
COAG endorsed the Rudd Report’s suggestion that the implementation period should com-
mence in 1995, and, that this process should be overseen and directed by a high level national 
steering committee. The formation and location of this committee was initially contested amongst 
some jurisdictions (Henderson, 1999), however, the matter was finally resolved when the Ministe-
rial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA) established the 
National Asian Languages and Studies in Australian Schools (NALSAS) Taskforce in September 
1994. Once established, the Taskforce was promoted as a co-operative initiative in the partnership 
between the Commonwealth, State and Territory governments and non-government education au-
thorities. It had an independent Chair, Professor Colin Mackerras from Griffith University,  and 
membership consisted of high level representatives from State and Territory government and non-
government schools and systems, together with representatives from the Commonwealth, the Aus-
tralian Vice-Chancellors” Committee, MCEETYA, and the Vocational Education and Training 
sector20. A Commonwealth-funded Secretariat supported Taskforce operations, and it was based in 
the Languages and Cultures Unit of the Department of Education in Queensland. 
The Taskforce’s agenda was determined by four specific terms of reference, outlined by 
MCEETYA. First, the Taskforce was required to develop a detailed implementation plan for 
NALSAS, to be ratified by MCEETYA, based on the endorsed recommendations of the Rudd Re-
port. Second, the Taskforce had to facilitate the collaborative implementation of NALSAS. Third, 
it was to develop “and facilitate the implementation of a publicity/awareness strategy of the impor-
tance of Asian languages/cultures education” (NALSAS Taskforce, 1996a, p. 1). Fourth, the Task-
force had to provide an annual report to MCEETYA. As well, COAG was to receive a Taskforce 
report for the first three years of its operation.  
Essentially, the NALSAS Taskforce was responsible for the co-ordination of the Strategy, 
while the responsibility for implementing it rested with State and Territory education authorities in 
the partnership. The Rudd Report made clear that certain issues had to be addressed if its policy 
goals were to be achieved. These were the “problems of language teacher competence and supply” 
(Rudd, 1994, p.127); the “development and provision of quality curricula and related teaching re-
sources for programs in Asian languages and studies” (p. 129); and the “development of distance 
learning Asian languages and Asian studies programs” (p. 130).  
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The magnitude of coordinating this task was complicated by the fact that the Strategy’s fund-
ing arrangement was contested between the Commonwealth and the partners. This was not re-
solved until July 1995 and resulted in the Taskforce receiving only 5% of the Commonwealth 
NALSAS contribution21. Moreover, the Commonwealth stipulated that this allocation was to be 
used for collaborative projects with a national focus, and approved by the Minister. Accordingly, 
the Taskforce prioritised the development of infrastructures which facilitated addressing issues 
such as teacher training and professional development, curriculum materials, and distance educa-
tion as its goals. The assumption was that this approach would gradually impact upon LOTE 
teacher supply and quality, materials production and modes of delivery across the jurisdictions and 
support the partners” efforts to achieve the Strategy’s participation target goals for 2006. These 
were reflected in the NALSAS Strategy Implementation Plan, presented to the fourth MCEETYA 
meeting on 8 December 1995. The wording of the Preamble to this plan noted that the Taskforce 
had  
 
interpreted its terms of reference to focus on the collaborative strategies for the implementation of the 
NALSAS on the understanding that, in addition, individual jurisdictions have their own implementation 
plans in support of the strategy. (NALSAS Taskforce, 1995, p. 2)  
 
Indeed, the Implementation Plan Format was designed so that each recommendation of the 
Rudd Report22 was paralleled by a “Responsibility lies with” column indicating the Taskforce’s 
interpretation of whether the recommendations were to be collaborative “as distinct from being a 
matter for individual jurisdictions” (National Asian Languages and Studies in Australian Schools 
(NALSAS) Taskforce, 1995, p. 2). It might be argued that this format was simply an effective 
means of delineating responsibilities in the implementation process. However, this paper contends 
the format evinced the delicate balancing act the Taskforce had to negotiate as it steered the im-
plementation process between the demands of different jurisdictions. Moreover, as foreshadowed 
with reference to the political and structural constraints on the Taskforce, this balancing act was a 
subset of broader debates between the States and Territories with the Commonwealth about fund-
ing the Strategy and who was in control of the Taskforce (Henderson, 1999).  
In determining whether the Taskforce achieved the implementation goals established during 
the first term of its operation, data was analysed from two reviews of the Taskforce. The first was 
a Ministerial Review commissioned by the newly elected Howard government’s Minister for 
Schools, Vocational Education and Training, David Kemp, during 1996 (DEETYA, 1997). The 
second involved a major evaluation commissioned by the Department of Employment, Education, 
Training and Youth Affairs (DEETYA, 1998), and contracted out to the Faculty of Asian Studies 
at the Australian National University during the second half of 1997. It is referred to as the ANU 
Review in this paper. Other data was obtained from Taskforce reports to MCEETYA, notably 
Partnership for Change (NALSAS Taskforce, 1998), Workgroup reports to the Taskforce, and 
minutes from Taskforce meetings.  
It must be noted that inconsistencies with the collection of comparative national data made it 
difficult to identify precisely what the Taskforce achieved by the end of 1998. Part of the problem 
with identifying accurate quantitative data can be explained by the differences within the stake-
holders across the States and Territories, and within the government and non-government sector. 
This difficulty was not restricted to the priority languages, for example, despite the efforts of the 
MCEETYA Taskforce on School Statistics (TOSS), and the languages working party that was 
formed under it, efforts to ascertain national data on a number of issues concerning all languages 
study in Australian schools were problematic.  
With reference to the priority languages, the funding agreement finally negotiated between the 
partners and the Commonwealth enabled individual jurisdictions to set their own developmental 
targets whilst they worked to achieve those recommended in the Rudd Report. Also, the long-term 
nature of the Strategy, and the fact that some jurisdictions could not commence the NALSAS ini-
tiative from the start of 1995 because of a lack of infrastructure and trained teachers, meant that 
the implementation process varied considerably during the early phase.  
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Moreover, although some systems endorsed the notion of data collection procedures, others ob-
jected “to the resource implications of annual data collection” (DEETYA, 1998, p. 15). Tensions 
between the Commonwealth and the States were evident in the fact that some systems wanted 
clarification about “the use the Commonwealth intends to make of the data” (p. 15) and resisted 
efforts for accountability (A. Langdon, personal communication, November 25, 1998). For exam-
ple, some systems feared that if their figures indicated favourable progress, the Commonwealth 
might conclude that the jurisdiction was capable of continuing the program through its own re-
sources and withdraw funding. Similarly, if progress was slow, the fear was the Commonwealth 
might decide that further funding was not worthwhile and withdraw funding. Because of this un-
certainty, some systems were reluctant to provide accurate figures. Such ambivalence was com-
pounded because of the uncertainty of the Commonwealth’s long term commitment to funding the 
Strategy.  
With respect to languages, it was not possible to draw any conclusions in terms of qualitative 
targets, as the Commonwealth, States and Territories had not reached agreement on the most ap-
propriate means of measuring and recording this data. Yet, as part of its concern to develop exit 
proficiency outcomes for senior secondary school students, the Taskforce had commissioned a 
team of experts to focus on two tasks. These were, first to develop a generic framework and proce-
dures for describing student proficiency outcomes and second, to develop language specific de-
scriptors for four different levels of exit proficiency for secondary schools students in Japanese23.  
Obviously, it was a matter of time before such work impacted across jurisdiction, for, despite 
the recommendations of the Rudd Report (see Recommendation 5C in Rudd, 1994, p. 108), by 
1997, national proficiency monitoring relied upon Year 12 enrolments and reports from various 
Boards of Studies on standards achieved by candidates in each State and Territory. Likewise, a 
commitment from the Commonwealth government was required to increase the emphasis upon 
proficiency. As the ANU report observed,  
 
(s)tate policies of offering languages in all schools mean that enrolments are given higher priority then 
proficiency. Unless the Commonwealth gives priority to emphasising proficiency, it seems unlikely that 
this emphasis will change. (DEETYA, 1998, p. 10)  
 
This preference amongst systems for quantitative measurements hampered Taskforce efforts to 
identify qualitative descriptors and recording mechanisms. Nevertheless, the Taskforce pursued its 
goals, and the following section details the achievements of its collaborative work as categorised 
in the recent Partnership for Change report (NALSAS Taskforce, 1998, pp. 12–19) to the Ministe-
rial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs. 
Despite the limitations of data collection and the work to be done on identifying qualitative 
outcomes, some important conclusions can be drawn from the Strategy’s implementation. By way 
of illustration, the 1996 National Report on Schooling in Australia (ANR) (MCEETYA, 1996) and 
individual jurisdiction accountability reports to the Commonwealth to 1997 provided enough data 
to indicate that by 1996 three of the priority languages, Chinese (Mandarin), Japanese and Indone-
sian,  were part of the 12 Asian languages taught in all the States and Territories24.  
Most significantly, at the broadest level, the achievements of the NALSAS strategy were re-
flected in the increasing number of students studying an Asian language. Indeed, the number of 
government primary and secondary school students studying an Asian language grew by more than 
50% from 323 769 in 1994 to 517 730 in 1997 (NALSAS Taskforce, 1998, p. iii). The figures for 
1997-98 indicated that more than 600,000 Australian students, or 20% of the current school popu-
lation, were studying an Asian language25. In the three Catholic commissions where data has been 
collected since 1994, more than a 50% increase was recorded in enrolments for Asian languages. 
The number of government schools offering the target Asian languages increased from 2573 
schools in 199426 to 3693 in 1997 (p. iii). Notably, this figure had risen to almost 4000 government 
schools across the nation, or approximately 53.4% of the national total, by 1998. By this time, over 
1000 schools had participated in the Access Asia program (p. 6).  
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This expansion in the number of government and non-government schools offering the priority 
languages and studies demonstrated the increasing emphasis on Asian languages and studies pol-
icy across the jurisdictions. This paper suggest that it also indicated that education systems were 
undergoing a cultural transformation and recognising the educational and strategic benefits of a 
long term commitment to Asian languages and studies in the school curriculum. The formative 
aspects of this period were also important, for they set in motion the processes which, by 1998, 
resulted in approximately 2500 teachers trained or retrained in the four priority languages (p. 9), 
and in the number of teachers who experienced professional development in Asian languages and 
studies of Asia. It was significant that NALSAS established the national infrastructure for this, 
whilst education authorities across the jurisdictions developed the infrastructure to implement 
training and professional development courses locally. These achievements were considerable and 
demonstrated that despite the difficulties the Taskforce faced, the implementation period to 1998 
was most successful. It established a firm foundation for the Strategy’s long-term focus and goal 
that the Strategy would be fully implemented by 2006 (Rudd, 1994, p. 137). 
 
5  Implementation in the second quadrennium and the cessation of Commonwealth funding 
 
The Department of Education, Science and Training (DEST) commissioned a further evalua-
tion of the NALSAS Strategy during its second quadrennium in 2001. Significantly,  the review 
noted “(t)he overall conclusion to be drawn from the evidence available for evaluation is that, 
while significant progress continues to be made towards the achievements of the NALSAS agenda, 
the program is not yet at a stage where continued implementation would be sustained by jurisdic-
tions without continued Commonwealth support” (Erebus Consulting Partners, 2002, p. xii). The 
review recommended that the  Ministerial Council on Employment, Education, Training and 
Youth Affairs (MCEETYA) be encouraged to make a strong commitment to the NALSAS objec-
tives through a national position statement. It suggested that the 1994 targets, that 60% of Year 10 
and 15% of Year 12 students would be studying a NALSAS languages by 2006, were “overly am-
bitious” and that “more realistic targets should now be set” (Erebus Consulting Partners, 2002, p. 
xiii). The 2001 evaluation also recommended that assessment of student outcomes through a na-
tional sample survey at Year 6/7 and Year 10 in Japanese and Indonesian occur in 2003 and then 
every four years, adding the assessment of Chinese in future years. Significantly, the review rec-
ommended that to capitalise on the gains made so far, and to ensure they become further embed-
ded in the curriculum of Australian schools, Commonwealth funding for the NALSAS strategy be 
continued for a further quadrennium in declining annual amounts.  
Despite the recommendations of this evaluation, on 2 May 2002, the (then) Education Minister, 
Brendan Nelson, announced days before the 2002/3 release of the Federal Budget, that the Howard 
Government would terminate its A$120 million commitment to NALSAS. At the time of Brendan 
Nelson’s announcement approximately “785,355 students across Australia were studying one of 
the four NALSAS languages” (Rudd, 2005, p. 10). Commonwealth funding ceased in December 
2002 with Minister Nelson’s claims that the conclusion of the second quadrennium of NALSAS 
was the natural time to finish the program and that it was also timely to give the program over to 
the States and Territories. Yet at the COAG meeting of 1994, the Commonwealth had endorsed the 
long-term Strategy until at least 2006 and finally agreed to fund 50% of the costs in 1995. As 
Rudd observed, enormous gains had been made in establishing a culture of language learning: 
 
(t)he Review of Studies of Asia in Australian Schools report, which had been released in early 2002, es-
tablished in a survey across 1000 schools, confirmed that 73.5% of schools taught an Asian language; 
25.2% taught Chinese; 31% taught Indonesian; 31.1% taught Japanese; and 2% taught Korean. (Rudd, 
2005, pp. 9–10) 
 
Significantly, in 2002 the peak body of Australian Asianists, the Asian Studies Association of 
Australia (ASAA), argued in a major report that “Australia’s long-standing Asia-knowledge base 
is in jeopardy” (ASAA, 2002, p. xvi). The ASAA report made 15 recommendations which articu-
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lated how Australia might “reposition, extend and deepen its Asia knowledge in ways that will 
enhance security, prosperity and cultural communication” (ASAA, 2002, p. xvi). Thus whilst the 
ASAA report noted that there was a now a possibility that “Australia’s Asia-knowledge capacity 
would decline rather than grow – at a time when the need for it to grow, and the potential benefits 
from such growth, have never been greater” (ASAA, 2002, p. 3), the Howard government termi-
nated the Commonwealth’s commitment to the NALSAS strategy. The flow-on effect between 
school and tertiary study in Asian languages was notable. “The teaching of Asian studies and lan-
guages is contracting so dramatically that Asian specialists are now worried that the foundations 
for Australia’s Asian engagement are faltering, perhaps terminally” (Gurry, 2004, p. 1). By 2004 a 
survey, supervised by a specialist in Chinese, Anne McLaren, at the University of Melbourne, 
noted that of 800,000 people studying at Australian universities, approximately 1,800 students 
were studying Indonesian at tertiary level during 2004, which represented a decline of 15 per cent 
since 2001. In 2005, Professor Robin Jeffrey, Immediate Past-President, ASAA referred to the 
implications of an Australian Financial Review (AFR) editorial which concluded that Australia 
needed to reinforce its capacity to work smartly in the Asian region, through public investment in 
the tools of being Asia-savvy as well as through trade and good neighbourliness. “Among the tools 
listed was language education”, (Jeffrey, 2005, p. 1). Jeffrey noted: 
 
The AFR is right. The shortage of Asian language skills became obvious to all when agencies working to 
help in the tsunami relief effort cried out for those who could speak the languages of the Indian Ocean 
rim. It has been evident to the ASAA for some time, particularly since it began tracking enrolments in 
Asian languages in Australian universities in 2001. (2005, p. 1) 
 
In a recent speech Rudd (2007, p. 2), in his capacity as Leader of Federal Labor’s Opposition, 
argued that “education must lie at the core of our long-term strategy for our national security” 
given that China and India will transform the global strategic, economic and environmental order 
by the middle of the next century. Such sentiments echo the strategic policy push which saw the 
acceptance of the NALSAS Strategy in 1994. 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
This paper has argued that COAG’s decision in 1994 to implement the Rudd Report was un-
precedented in the history of the policy moves for Asian languages and studies in Australia. The 
broadest analysis of the Rudd Report suggests it can be conceptualised as evidence of the govern-
ment’s capacity to prepare Australians for the reality of regional and global change. As a political, 
and ultimately practical solution to the inertia on developing a national strategy for Asia literacy in 
Australia, the Report demonstrated the use of political power in determining the kind of knowl-
edge deemed most useful to the national interest. This paper also claims that the implementation of 
the Rudd Report in the NALSAS Strategy was successful in establishing the formative foundations 
for learning Asian languages in Australian schools. Further, it contends that the Commonwealth’s 
decision to terminate its funding agreement before the scheduled time, was short-sighted and un-
dermines Australia’s future capacity for regional engagement. 
 
 
Notes 
1 Of course, the national interest is a contested term and its significance varies according to the particular 
interest group or policy community which makes claim to it. Australian Asianists argue that Asian engage-
ment was in the national interest because of the long term implications for Australia’s cultural, social, eco-
nomic, security and strategic interests. 
2As Reid (1984) noted, the government of Australian was based upon the Westminster system. Its principles, 
“implied but not specified in the Australian constitution, sets up lines of responsibility for decision making 
and implementation” (Davis, Wanna, Warhurst & Weller, 1993, p. 73). Although schooling was not men-
tioned in section 51 of the Constitution, which established the Commonwealth government”s powers, there 
were some aspects of the Constitution which permitted Commonwealth involvement in schooling. As Bor-
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geest (1994) observed, the 1946 amendment to the Constitution inserted the Commonwealth’s authority to 
provide “benefits to students” (Section 51, xxiiiA). Similarly, the States grants power of section 96 permitted 
the Commonwealth to make grants to the States for what the Commonwealth deemed appropriate. Borgeest 
(1994) claimed that this grant provision has provided the Commonwealth with a “supple source” of power in 
schooling and has formed the “principle foundation for the power relationships within federal financial ar-
rangements” (p. 3). This notion of “supple power”, combined with the structural factor that the Common-
wealth has the greater revenue raising capacity has meant that the Commonwealth controlled the purse strings.  
3 This was recognised in the first National Report on Australian Schooling (Australian Education Council, 
1991). It noted that while the “States and Territories have major constitutional and financial responsibility for 
schooling ... The Commonwealth, along with States and Territories, has a significant role in identifying na-
tional priorities for schooling” (p. iii). The Commonwealth’s national role was articulated in this document as 
“considering schooling more broadly, in the context of a nation undergoing significant social and economic 
adjustment and dependent upon a well-educated workforce. In cooperation with the States, the Common-
wealth plays a significant role in addressing resourcing, equity and quality issues through its general recur-
rent, capital and specific purpose programs” (p. 1). 
4 The Australian Education Council (1936–93) was the nation’s most cogent and longstanding education fo-
rum. As part of COAG’s efficiency agenda to evaluate and prune the number of peak bodies and operating 
councils, the AEC was replaced in late 1993 by a new intergovernmental council – the Ministerial Council of 
Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA).   
5 The Rudd Report’s origins can be traced back to Queensland’s LOTE policy, implemented by the (then) 
Education Minister in the Goss Labor Government, Paul Braddy. Goss and Rudd were convinced that Queen-
sland’s LOTE targets indicated that it was the only State likely to achieve the national goals established by 
the National Strategy (Asian Studies Council, 1988).  See Henderson (1999). 
6 Significantly, the Commonwealth reserved its position on Recommendation 7A, the suggested funding 
commitment of 50% from the Commonwealth and 50% from the States and Territories. See Rudd (1994, p. 
170). 
7 It must be noted that the political landscape had changed considerably between the first COAG meeting in 
Perth 1992 and the third COAG meeting in Hobart 1994 which endorsed the Working Party’s Report. While 
Labor retained power during the 1993 federal election, Queensland was the only State with Labor in power in 
1994 
8 The notion of this collaborative strategy stemmed from Special Premiers” Conferences held in 1990 and 
1991 when the principle of national portability of goods and qualifications was endorsed. As a result of the 
general acknowledgement that there was considerable intersectorial overlap, the peak Vocational Education 
and Training (VET) body, the Ministers of Vocational Educational and Training (MOVEET) met in joint 
sessions with members of the peak intergovernment council for State Ministers for Education, the Australian 
Education Council (AEC) from 1991. The general push was for coordination between sections. 
9 The Rudd Report’s recommendations for a critical mass was similar to the policy prescription of the Na-
tional Strategy (1988). The former called for “a strong cadre of professionals equipped with high levels of 
languages/cultures proficiency relevant to their particular profession; a broader group of support personnel in 
service industries etc where reasonable level language/cultures skills will be necessary for direct dealings 
with clients from regional countries; and a general familiarity across the breadth of Australian society with 
the historical, geographical and cultural diversity of the region reinforced with some basic familiarity with 
regional languages (this latter group also constituting what the Asian Studies Council refers to as the "reser-
voir" needed from which to derive more highly skilled "professional" and "support" groups)” (Rudd 1994, p. 
98). 
10 See the National Strategy’s (1988) statement on the need for a “deep and solid layering of national educa-
tional expertise” (pp. 11–12) in Asian languages and cultures. 
11 See Asian Studies Council (1989, Vol. 1, p. 13). 
12 The Report did not try “to evaluate the relative merits of studying European as opposed to Asian languages. 
There is plainly a rationale, in part economic but principally cultural, for the continued teaching of certain 
European languages in the overall language programs of Australian schools. The report neither seeks to chal-
lenge this rationale nor to defend it. Rather, the working group’s terms of reference makes clear that it is re-
quired to focus exclusively on developing a strategy for the implementation of comprehensive Asian lan-
guages and cultures education in Australian schools - not to debate the relative merits of "Asian" versus 
"European" (Rudd, 1994, p. 4). 
13 These were “first, that East Asia is of long term economic significance to Australia; second, that there was 
a direct relationship between Asian languages and cultures skills and increased economic performance” 
(Rudd, 1994, p. 16). 
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14 This report, Speaking of Business - The Needs of Business and Industry for Language Skills (ALLC, 1994) 
was published under the auspices of the Australian Language and Literacy Council. Cavalier (1994) argued in 
the Preface to the report that “a mischief is abroad which exaggerates the economic importance of language 
study. It is a mischief whose twin is the hoary notion that languages, like our schools and their curriculum, 
should be only an extension of the transient needs of our economy. The Council rejects the exaggerated value 
of language study as a nonsense” (p. vii). This report argued that English was “the most widely used interna-
tional language”, and that it was “the major international language for business purposes” (p. 9). Finally, it 
was claimed that English was an “Asian language” and “the second language of Asia” (p. 10). 
15 It might be assumed from the tone of this critique that the members of the Australian Language and Liter-
acy Council were unanimous in their attack on the Rudd Report. However, according to one Board Member, 
Professor Colin Mackerras, this was not the case (C. Mackerras, personal communication, November 17, 
1998). 
16 Kirkpatrick’s (1995a) case was that the cultures, rather than the languages, of these Asian nations should be 
taught along with the cultures of Anglo-European and Aboriginal Australians at this level. However, his real 
argument was to advance the study of Indonesian, as the only Asian language suitable to be taught across the 
school system because “there are several characteristics of Indonesian that make it an easier language for 
native English-speakers than the other three ‘languages of most importance’ as identified by DFAT and 
COAG” (Kirkpartick 1995a, p. 26). Moreover, Kirkpatrick claimed that the expertise necessary for the level 
of small business interaction in Asia assumed in the Report”s recommended proficiency levels, could only 
come from “background-speakers the majority of whom will not even reach a basic level of proficiency in 
their chosen language given the grave discrepancy that exists between the time needed to achieve basic profi-
ciency and the time the curriculum allows” (p. 11). See also Kirkpatrick (1995b). 
17 Rizvi’s (1997) argument was that “Australians have been asked to make a decisive ideological shift in their 
thinking, away from the colonialist frame that has traditionally informed their perceptions of Asia to a post-
colonial outlook which challenges the racist assumptions of cultural dominance and superiority. Yet most of 
their attempts so far to revise their thinking have at best been clumsy, with the new practices of representation 
failing to make a decisive break from the residual racist expressions that had rendered Asians as a homoge-
nised mass, socially inept and culturally inferior” (pp. 199–120). 
18 Singh (1996) claimed that “COAG’s Rudd Report has no sense outside the various and contradictory tradi-
tions that appropriate it. These contexts have influenced the production of the Rudd Report; they will con-
strain, act upon and facilitate its analysis and interpretation as much as they are likely to influence its imple-
mentation ...” (p. 158). 
19 Said (1978/1991) noted that his work employed “close textual readings whose goal is to reveal the dialectic 
between individual text or writer and the complex collective formation to which [the writer’s] work is a con-
tribution” (pp. 23–24). 
20 According to the appointed Chair, Professor Colin Mackerras (1995), this Taskforce consisted mainly of 
“educational bureaucrats” (p. 95). Professor Hugh Clarke, Head of the School of Asian Studies of the Univer-
sity of Sydney was the Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee representative on the Taskforce, while the 
Asian Studies profession was represented through the membership of Mackerras and Clarke. From the outset 
the Taskforce was dominated by State education systems and Commonwealth representatives and efforts by 
the Asian Studies Association of Australia for representation were rejected. 
21 The remaining 95% of Commonwealth NALSAS funds was allocated on a per capita basis of school en-
rolments to the various administering authorities across the jurisdictions.  
22 The Rudd Report was referred to as the COAG Report in the NALSAS Strategy Implementation Plan 
(1995). 
23 These were survival proficiency, minimum social, minimum vocational and useful vocational levels. 
24 The ARN survey noted that by 1996 the number of students studying Japanese had increased by almost 
50% from 1995 figures, distinguishing it as the most widely studied language in Australia. See the National 
Report on Schooling in Australia (MCEETYA, 1996, p. 115, pp. 117–119).  
25 These figures reflect enrolments in government and Catholic schools, national data from independent 
schools was unavailable (NALSAS, 1998, p. 6). 
26 Data from Queensland and Tasmania were not included in this figure as their secondary school figures 
were unavailable. 
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